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The 1969 Amendments to the Minnesota State
Act Against Discrimination and the Uniform
Law Commissioner's Model Anti-Discrimination
Act: A Comparative Analysis and Evaluation
Carl A. Auerbach*
I. INTRODUCTION
The 1969 Minnesota Legislature further amended the State
Act Against Discrimination, effective June 6, 1969,1 and thereby
strengthened the Act in several ways. Certain substantive prohi-
bitions were added-against discrimination on the basis of sex
in connection with employment, against the maintenance by an
employer of "a system of employment which unreasonably ex-
cludes" an applicant for employment and against blockbusting.
Significant procedural changes were also made. A determi-
nation by the Commissioner of Human Rights that no probable
cause exists to credit a charge of an unfair discriminatory prac-
tice was subjected to appeal to a Review Board of the State
Board of Human Rights. The crippling condition imposed in
1967 upon the granting of interim relief was eliminated, namely,
that before the Commissioner could obtain interim relief from a
district court, in cases in which he found probable cause, the
charging party had to give security for the payment of costs and
damages to the respondent in the event the complaint was ulti-
mately dismissed.
Finally, the armory of sanctions imposed for violating the
State Act was enlarged. Authority was granted to order anyone
found to have engaged in an unfair discriminatory practice to pay
damages, within prescribed limits, to the person discriminated
against. If the final order of a hearing panel or examiner re-
quires a lessee or renter to be evicted from a dwelling unit in-
volved in an unfair discriminatory practice, the lessor found to
have engaged in such a practice was made liable for the actual
damages sustained by the lessee or renter as a result of the evic-
tion. Every licensing or regulatory agency of the state or its
political subdivisions was empowered to suspend or revoke the
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1. The 1969 amendments are set forth in ch. 975, (1969] Minn.
Laws 1937. The State Act Against Discrimination is set forth in Mu.
STAT. ch. 363 (1969).
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license or certificate of public convenience and necessity of any
holder failing to stop the unfair discriminatory practice in which
it was previously found to have engaged, provided that the
agency is otherwise authorized to take such action. State depart-
ments and agencies were forbidden to award contracts to any
person or firm which does not possess and does not have a pend-
ing application for a certificate of compliance with the State Act.
The Commissioner of Human Rights was authorized to issue these
certificates and the hearing panels and examiners were au-
thorized to deny, suspend or revoke them in the event of viola-
tion of the Act's provisions. Finally, it was made a misdemeanor
for any person to deny, or to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce
another person to deny an individual or group of individuals the
full and equal enjoyment of any place of public accommodation.
These are significant improvements. But the legislature did
not remedy all the serious deficiencies of the State Act which I
described in 1967.2 Furthermore, some of the changes it made
in 1969 are of dubious merit and raise new problems and difficul-
ties. This article will evaluate the 1969 amendments and com-
pare them with the Uniform Law Commissioners' Model Anti-Dis-
crimination Act.3 It will not repeat the material contained in
the 1967 article but will give the background necessary to an un-
derstanding of the 1969 amendments.
II. THE PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT
A. DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEX
The most important addition of the 1969 amendments is the
prohibition of discrimination in employment on the basis of sex.
Section 363.12, subdivision 1 of the State Act now declares it "is
also the public policy of this state to secure for individuals in this
state, freedom from discrimination because of sex in connection
with employment." Subdivision 2 of the section proclaims the
"opportunity to obtain employment without discrimination be-
cause of sex" to be "a civil right." The obligation not to dis-
criminate because of sex is imposed upon labor organizations, 4
2. See Auerbach, The 1967 Amendments to the Minnesota State
Act Against Discrimination and the Uniform Law Commissioners' Model
Anti-Discrimination Act: A Comparative Analysis and Evaluation, 52
!IMINN. L. REV. 231 (1967).
3. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS, UNIFORM LAW COMVISSIONERS' MODEL ANT-DIScRIMINATION ACT
(1966) [hereinafter cited as MODEL ANTI-DSCRIMINATION ACT].
[Vol. 55:259
1970] MINNESOTA ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACT 261
employers5 and employment agencies.0
The State Act in this respect now conforms to the Model
Act. Henceforth, too, cases of alleged sex discrimination in
employment previously handled under Title VII of the Federal
Civil Rights Act of 1964 may be handled under the State Act.7
B. PRoHBrnm PRAcTIcEs
1. By employers. Prior to the 1969 amendments, the State Act
forbade an employer "to refuse" to hire "an applicant" for em-
ployment for any of the proscribed reasons. The 1969 amend-
ments added the prohibition that employers may not "maintain a
system of employment which unreasonably excludes" an appli-
cant for employment.8 This prohibition is not contained in the
Model Act, which forbids an employer to "fail" as well as to
"refuse" to hire "an individual" for any of the proscribed reasons.
The purpose of its addition is not entirely clear from its lan-
guage.
Nothing of moment turns on the absence in the State Act of
the words "to fail" or its use of "applicant for employment" in-
stead of "an individual." The 1969 amendment does not seek to
bring the State Act closer to the Model Act in these respects or
expressly to authorize plans to fill vacancies or hire new em-
ployees so as to eliminate or reduce imbalance with respect to
race, color, creed, religion, national origin or sex.9
Rather the amendment seems directed at situations in which
an employer refuses to hire an applicant for employment, not di-
rectly because of the applicant's race, color, creed, religion, na-
tional origin or sex, but because the applicant fails to satisfy the
prescribed qualifications for employment, if these qualifications
are unreasonable and the applicant's failure to satisfy them is re-
lated to one of the proscribed factors. In such situations, too, in-
dividuals may never apply for employment, knowing they do not
possess the stipulated qualifications.
So the amendment may prohibit an employer from imposing
unnecessarily and unreasonably high qualifications for certain
jobs-for example, that all applicants must be high school gradu-
4. M nw. STAT. § 363.03(1) (1) & (4) (b) (1969).
5. MINx. STAT. § 363.03 (1) (2) & (4) (b) (1969).
6. MN=. STAT. § 363.03 (1) (3) & (4) (b) (1969).
7. See tit. VlI, Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 703, 704, 706, 708 & 709,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) (1), 2000e-3, 2000e-5, 2000e-7 & 2000e-8 (1964).
8. MAb-. S.AT. § 363.03 (1) (2) (a) (1969).
9. See Auerbach, supra note 2, at 272-75.
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ates, if the proportion of individuals of a particular race, color,
creed, religion, national origin or sex who are high school gradu-
ates is smaller than the proportion of high school graduates in
the total population. It may also prohibit the systematic failure
of an employer to bring his job openings to the attention of the
black community. Finally, it may outlaw an employer's use of
uniform tests for job applicants if these tests disfavor individuals
of a particular race, color, creed, religion, national origin or sex
and fail accurately to predict the potential job performance of
such individuals. However, if an employer decides to give to such
individuals different tests better designed to predict their job per-
formance, he may run into trouble under the State Act. For the
employer must then know the race, color, creed, religion, na-
tional origin or sex of the applicants for employment. Yet sec-
tion 363.03, subdivision 1 (4) (a) of the State Act forbids an em-
ployer, or an employment agency, to require an applicant for em-
ployment to furnish information "that pertains to the applicant's
race, color, creed, religion or national origin . . . ." Information
concerning the applicant's sex may still be required.
On the whole, the prohibition added by the 1969 amend-
ments may have salutary effects by requiring employers to take
affirmative steps to widen the employment opportunities of in-
dividuals belonging to certain racial and ethnic groups and of
women generally. A liberal reading of the pre-existing provi-
sions of the State Act might have accomplished the same ends.
The added prohibition makes it easier to do so. It is difficult to
understand, therefore, why labor organizations were not ex-
pressly forbidden to maintain systems of qualification for ap-
prenticeship and membership or of referral for employment
which unreasonably exclude applicants for membership or mem-
bers for any of the proscribed reasons. It should be pointed out,
too, that a liberal reading of section 363.03, subdivision 1 (1) may
accomplish this result.
2 By employers, labor organizations and employment agencies.
As stated above, section 363.03, subdivision 1 (4) generally prohib-
its an employer, employment agency or labor organization from
requiring an applicant for employment or for membership in a la-
bor organization to furnish information pertaining to his race,
color, creed, religion or national origin. Prior to the 1969 amend-
ments, only one exception from this prohibition was made. Infor-
mation pertaining to the national origin of an applicant may be
elicited if required by the United States, the State of Minnesota
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or a political subdivision or agency of either, in the interest of
national security.
The 1969 amendments added another exception. Informa-
tion "pertaining to the race, color, creed, religion or national
origin of the applicant" may be elicited if "required by the
United States or a political subdivision or agency" thereof "for
the purpose of compliance with the public contracts act." No
further explanation is given of the reference to the federal "pub-
lic contracts act." The federal statute generally so called is the
Walsh-Healey Act,iO which is not pertinent for purposes of sec-
tion 363.03, subdivision 1 (4) of the State Act. The 1969 legislature
probably had in mind the executive order of the President
which implements the guarantee embodied in Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act of nondiscrimination in employment by
contractors and subcontractors performing under contracts with
the federal government or under federally assisted construction
contracts." Under the rules and regulations issued by the
Secretary of Labor, to. whom the administration of the execu-
tive order has been delegated, information pertaining to the
race or national origin of applicants for employment may be re-
quired, particularly in connection with affirmative action pro-
grams.1 2
It is strange that a similar exception was not made by sec-
tion 363.03, subdivision 1(4) of the State Act when the information
in question is required by the State of Minnesota or a political
subdivision thereof, for a similar purpose, particularly in light of
the new sanctions imposed upon public contractors who violate
the State Act and the elaborate procedures provided for applying
them. s3 The reference to a "political subdivision" of the United
States can hardly be taken to refer to a state; this would be a
10. 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1964).
11. See Equal Employment Opportunity, Part II-Nondiscrimina-
tion in Employment by Government Contractors and Subcontractors;
and Part III-Nondiscrimination Provisions of Federally Assisted
Construction Contracts, Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. § 579 (1967),
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. IV 1969), as amended by Exec. Order No.
11,375, 3 C.F.R. § 320 (1967 Comp.), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. IV 1969),
and Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. § 133 (1969 Comp.).
-12. See Office -of Federal Contract Compliance, Equal Employ-
ment Oppcrtunity, U.S. Dep't of Labor, 41 C.F.R. § 60-1; 41 C.F.R.§ 60-2, 35 Fed. Reg. 2586 (1970). The Secretary of Labor has delegated
his powers under Executive Order No. 11,246, as amended, to the Di-
rector of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance in the Department
of Labor, except for the power to issue rules and regulations of a gen-
eral nature. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.2 (1970).
13. See pp. 280-97 infra.
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most unusual way for the Minnesota Legislature to refer to the
state of Minnesota. The context of the whole section 363.03,
subdivision 1(4) precludes such a construction. In all probability,
it was an oversight to fail to include the state of Minnesota
and its political subdivisions. But the oversight may be em-
barrassing if the information in question is sought to be elicited
for purposes of enforcing the new provision affecting public
contractors, which we shall consider below.
III. THE PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION IN
REAL PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS
As amended in 1967, the State Act, unlike the Model Act,
contained no provision directed against "blockbusting. ' 14 The
1969 amendments added such a provision, using the language of
section 606 of the Model Act but with some significant differ-
ences.
The Model Act prohibits any "person" from engaging in
"blockbusting." The comparable provision of section 363.03, sub-
division 2(4) of the State Act covers only real estate brokers and
salesmen. It does not apply to real estate owners, managing
agents, other agents or financial institutions subject to other pro-
hibitions of section 363.03, subdivision 2. Yet those who engage
in blockbusting are not exclusively real estate brokers and sales-
men, and the antiblockbusting provision of the State Act should
not have been so limited.
Moreover, the Model Act imposes two separate prohibitions,
but the new section 363.03, subdivision 2(4) of the State Act im-
poses but one. The State Act makes it an unfair discriminatory
practice for
any real estate broker or real estate salesman, for the purpose
of inducing a real property transaction from which such per-
son or any of its members may benefit financially, to represent
that a change has occurred or will or may occur in the composi-
tion with respect to race, creed, color, or national origin of the
owners or occupants in the block, neighborhood, or area in
which the real property is located, and to represent, directly
or indirectly, that this change will or may result in undesirable
consequences in the block, neighborhood, or area in which the
real property is located, including but not limited to the lower-
ing of property values, an increase in criminal or antisocial
behavior, or a decline in the quality of schools or other public
facilities.' 5
Instead of the "and" emphasized in the quoted provision of
14. See Auerbach, supra note 2, at 255-56.
15. Emphasis added.
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the State Act, the Model Act contains "or." So the Model Act,
unlike the State Act, prohibits persons from inducing whites to
sell their property to them at low prices by representing that
the neighborhood is about to be opened to Negroes even though
they do not also represent that the neighborhood will or may
suffer undesirable consequences as a result. It is true that it is
difficult to imagine how a person can represent that undesirable
consequences will or may result from a change in the racial com-
position of a neighborhood without thereby representing that
such a change has occurred or will or may occur. Nevertheless
there is no reason for the State Act to prohibit the representation
as to change only when it is accompanied by a representation as
to undesirable consequences.
Finally, the 1969 Legislature did not adopt section 706(b) (9)
of the Model Act, which authorizes the administrative agency
to order "payment to [an injured party] of profits obtained by
the respondent through a violation" of the blockbusting prohi-
bition.16
IV. THE PROHIBITION OF OTHER
DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES
The 1969 amendments deleted the provisions of section
363.03, subdivisions 1 (4) - (7) and subdivision 2 (4) of the State Act.
In their place, a new subdivision 6 was added which reads:
It is an unfair discriminatory practice for any person, em-
ployer, labor organization, or employment agency:
(1) To intentionally engage in any economic or other re-
prisal against any person because that person has opposed any
practice forbidden under this [Act] or has filed a charge, testi-
fied, assisted, or participated in any manner in any investiga-
tion, proceeding, or hearing under this [Act];
(2) Intentionally to aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce a
person to engage in any of the practices forbidden by this
[Act];
(3) Intentionally to attempt to aid, abet, incite, compel, or
coerce a person to engage in any of the practices forbidden by
this [Act];
(4) To intentionally obstruct or prevent any person from
16. There are other differences between the anti-blockbusting
provisions of the State and Model Acts, apart from the differences
highlighted above, but they are minor. The State Act, but not the Model
Act, prohibits the representation of undesirable consequences gener-
ally and uses the enumeration in the Model Act for illustrative pur-
poses only and it prohibits such representation "directly or indirectly."
Finally, the State Act specifies as an illustration of an undesirable
consequence a decline in the quality of public facilities other than
schools; the Model Act does not.
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complying with the provisions of this [Act], or any order issued
thereunder, or to resist, prevent, impede, or interfere with the
commissioner or any of his employees or representatives in the
performance of duty under this [Act];
(5) To intentionally engage in any economic reprisal
against any person because that person has associated with a
person or group of persons of a different race, color, creed, re-
ligion or national origin.
In the main, the new subdivision 6 consolidates the over-
lapping provisions previously set forth in section 363.03, subdivi-
sions 1 (4)- (7) and subdivision 2 (4). It is expressly provided now,
as it was not previously, that only intentional action of the kind
described is prohibited.
The former subdivision 1 (4) was subject to the criticism that
it prohibited "retaliation in respect to rights or relationships
other than those protected against discrimination on the basis of
race, religion or ethnic background.' 17 For example, literally
read, subdivision 1(4) would have forbidden an individual to "ex-
clude another from his card party because that other person filed
a charge. . . or opposes practices forbidden by" the Act.18 The
new subdivision 6 is not immune from this criticism because it
prohibits not only any economic reprisal, but also any "other re-
prisal" (exclusion from a card party?) for the reasons indicated.
Subdivision 6(5) is entirely new. Prohibiting only economic
reprisals for the reasons set forth, it adds a prohibition of substan-
tial importance but of dubious value. It is unnecessary in part
because it overlaps other provisions of the State Act. In con-
nection with employment, public accommodations, public serv-
ices and educational institutions, the prohibitions of the State
Act are not limited to discriminatory practices based on the race,
color, creed, religion or national origin of the individual dis-
criminated against. They outlaw such practices even when they
are engaged in because of the race, color, creed, religion or na-
tional origin of other persons, such as the wife, natural or adopted
child, parent or associates of the person discriminated against.
But there was grave doubt whether the 1967 amendments to the
State Act achieved this result in connection with the prohibition
of discrimination in real property transactions.' 9 The new sub-
17. See Auerbach, supra note 2, at 271-72. The quotation is from
Bonfield, The Substance of American Fair Employment Practices Legis-
lation II-Employment Agencies, Labor Organizations and Others, 62
Nw. U. L. REv. 19, 39 (1967).
18. Bonfield, supra note 17, at 39-40. Bonfield's remarks are di-
rected at section 801 of the Model Act but also apply to subdivision 1 (4).
19. See Auerbach, supra note 2, at 257-58. There was also some
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division 6(5) removes all such doubt. To discriminate against a
prospective purchaser, renter or lessee of real property because
of the race, color, creed, religion or national origin of his wife,
child, parent or associates is to engage in economic reprisal for
the reasons proscribed by subdivision 6(5). But this result could
have been attained in much simpler and more direct fashion and
without the undesirable aspects of the broad prohibition in sub-
division 6(5). For unlike the State Act prior to the 1969 amend-
ments, subdivision 6(5) also prohibits economic reprisal which
does not involve employment, real property transactions, public
accommodations, public services or educational institutions or
any of the reasons for reprisal proscribed by subdivision 6(1).
For example, it would prohibit any person from refusing to deal
with a retailer because the retailer "has associated with a person
or group of persons of a ... race, color, creed, religion or national
origin" different from his own. Yet such an application of sub-
division 6(5) would constitute an undue infringement upon per-
sonal choice.
Certainly the prohibition in subdivision 6(5) is anomalous so
long as it is not also made unlawful to engage in economic re-
prisal against a person, divorced from the reasons enumerated
in subdivision 6(1), because of that person's own race, color,
creed, religion or national origin. Few, however, would question
the undesirability of making it unlawful for a white person to
refuse to patronize a retail store because it is owned by a Negro
or for a black person to refuse to patronize a retail store because
it is owned by a white. It is difficult to see any significant dif-
ference between this situation and that proscribed by subdivision
6(5). Moreover, the problems of enforcing the broad sweep of
subdivision 6 (5) will be formidable indeed.
If, of course, apart from any anti-discrimination law, a stat-
ute or the common law requires business entities to maintain
certain business relationships unless there is good cause to termi-
nate them, the race, color, creed, religion or national origin of one
of the parties to the relationship or that of his associates would
not constitute good cause. The public policy embodied in the
State Act would compel this result.
question whether this result was achieved by section 363.03 (5) (3). See
id. at 270.
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V. ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION
A. THE STATE BOARD OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The 1969 amendments enlarged the membership of the Board
from 15 to 24 and arranged staggered terms.20 The chairmen of
the State Commission on Indian Affairs and the Advisory Com-
mittee on Women's Affairs were made ex officio members of
the State Board of Human Rights. 21
Prior to the 1969 amendments, the State Board was em-
powered "to exercise the functions, powers, and duties of the
appeal board provided for" in the State Act. This reference to
the State Board as an appeal board was mistaken because the
hearing panels of the State Board acted solely as adjudicatory
bodies in the first instance and not as appeal boards.22 The 1969
amendments eliminated this reference to the State Board as an
appeal board but empowered the State Board to hear appeals
from findings of no probable cause by the Commissioner of Hu-
man Rights. 23 We shall consider this important change below.
B. POWERS OF COMMISSIONER OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 363.05, subdivision 1(10) of the State Act empowers
the Commissioner, as well as any hearing examiner, to "subpoena
witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony, and require the pro-
duction for examination of any books or papers relative to any
matter under investigation or in question."2'2 The State Act as
amended in 1967, however, itself contained no provision for en-
forcing this subpoena power. The 1969 amendments added sub-
division 2 to section 363.05, providing that:
Disobedience of a subpoena issued by the commissioner
pursuant to subdivision I shall be punishable in like manner as
a contempt of the district court in proceedings instituted upon
application of the commissioner made to the district court of the
county where the alleged unfair discriminatory practice in con-
nection with a charge made by a charging party or a complaint
filed by the commissioner has occurred or where the respondent
resides or has his principal place of business.
In this way, the State Act brings into play the provisions of
20. MbnqN. STAT. § 363.04(4) (1969).
21. MINN. STAT. §§ 3.922(5) & 363.04(8) (1969).
22. See MmN. STAT. § 363.071(1) (1969); Auerbach, supra note 2,
at 300-01.
23. MNN. STAT. §§ 363.04(4) & 363.06 (1969), amending MINN.
STAT. §§ 363.04 (4) & 363.06 (1967).
24. As to the authority of the hearing panels of the State Board of
Human Rights to exercise the powers granted by section 363.05 (1) (10),
see Auerbach, supra note 2, at 314-15.
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Minnesota Statutes, chapter 588 relating to contempt and chapter
596 relating to subpoenas. It should be noted that section 363.05,
subdivision 2 does not require the Commissioner to apply to a
court for the issuance of a judicial subpoena for disobedience of
which the punishment for contempt will be imposed. Disobedi-
ence of the Commissioner's subpoena is punishable as if it were a
district court's subpoena, but the applicable punishment may be
inflicted only by the appropriate district court under the applica-
ble provisions of chapters 588 and 596.
The venue provisions of the new section 363.05, subdivision 2
may create difficulty. They require the Commissioner, in the
event of disobedience of his subpoena, to resort to the district
court "of the county where the alleged unfair discriminatory
practice in connection with a charge made by a charging party or
a complaint filed by the commissioner has occurred or where the
respondent, defined in section 363.01, subdivision 8 as "a person
against whom a complaint has been filed or issued," resides or has
his principal place of business." These venue provisions seem to
assume that a charge has been made or a complaint issued before
the Commissioner acts under section 363.05, subdivision 2. Yet
this may not be the case. It is clear that the powers granted by
section 363.05, subdivision 1 (10) to obtain necessary evidence may
be exercised by the Commissioner before, as well as after, a com-
plaint is issued or even a charge is made.
It would not be reasonable to read the venue provisions of
section 363.05, subdivision 2 as limiting the substantive grant of
power in section 363.05, subdivision 1 (10). The simple objectives
with respect to venue sought to be achieved by section 363.05, sub-
division 2 can easily be attained even if a complaint has not been
issued and a change has not been made. The Commissioner will
know who the potential respondent is and probably where the
possible or suspected unfair discriminatory practice has occurred.
He should have no problem in selecting the district court deemed
appropriate by section 363.05, subdivision 2.
VI. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND
ADJUDICATION
A. CoMPLAI PROCMUME
1. Distinction between "charge" and "complaint." Section 363.06
distinguishes between a "charge," which is filed by a person
claiming to -be aggrieved by a violation of the Act, and a
"complaint," which is issued by the Commissioner if he de-
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termines, after investigation, that "probable cause exists to
credit" the charge. To tidy matters, the 1969 amendments added
definitions of the terms "charging party" and "complainant."
"Charging party" is defined as "a person filing a charge with
the commissioner or his designated agent pursuant to section
363.06, subd. 1."25 "Complainant" is defined as "the com-
missioner of human rights after he has issued a complaint pur-
suant to section 363.06."26 The term "charging party" was then
substituted for "complainant" in section 363.06, subdivision 4 (1).
2. Administrative and judicial review of a finding of no probable
cause. Before the 1969 amendments, the Commissioner's determi-
nation that probable cause did not exist to credit a charge was
not subject to any further administrative review. The 1969
amendments provide such review. Section 363.06, subdivision 4
(1) now states that the Commissioner's determination of no prob-
able cause "shall be a final decision of the department unless an
appeal is taken as ... provided in" a new subdivision 7 of the sec-
tion. Subdivision 7 provides that such appeals shall be taken
to the Review Board-a panel of three members of the State
Board of Human Rights selected to perform this function by
the Chairman of the State Board. It should be pointed out, by
way of contrast, that the Commissioner of Human Rights, not the
Chairman of the State Board, is authorized to select from the
Board membership the three-man panels (as well as the inde-
pendent examiners) to hear and adjudicate complaints. I do not
see any special reason for this difference, but I do not think the
matter is momentous.
Unlike the hearing panels which have an ad hoc existence
only, it seems that the Review Board is intended to be a standing
board which does not go out of business after each case. Of
course, its membership may vary from time to time at the pleas-
ure of the State Board Chairman, and its members may also be
selected to serve on hearing panels.
Under the new section 363.06, subdivision 7, a charging party
aggrieved by the Commissioner's determination of no probable
cause has 15 days after being served the required written notice
of this determination within which to appeal to the Review
Board. The charging party must serve a written notice of ap-
peal upon the Commissioner and the person against whom the
charge is directed. The Review Board must hold a hearing on
25. MIN. STAT. § 363.01(22) (1969).
26. MNN. STAT. § 363.01(23) (1969).
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the appeal within 30 days thereafter and give the parties at least
five days written notice of the time and place of the hearing.
The charging party, who may be represented by counsel, and
the Commissioner must be present at the hearing. The re-
spondent may attend.
The hearing is to be "informal"; the Commissioner is re-
quired to make available to the Review Board all the informa-
tion in his possession relevant to the case. The charging party
may introduce any evidence relevant to the charge whether or
not, apparently, such evidence was previously furnished to the
Commissioner.
The Review Board is to "hear testimony, review all the evi-
dence, and issue a decision in writing with a statement of reasons
therefor." Its decision "shall be final unless it finds that probable
cause exists in which instance it shall remand the case to the
commissioner for further proceedings."
The administrative review thus provided has advantages. It
is a de novo review before a body that will not participate in any
way in making the original administrative determination of no
probable cause. In addition, although the State Act contains no
such express requirement, it makes it possible, if that is thought
desirable, to assure that no member of the Review Board will
serve on a state board panel to judge a case in which the Review
Board reversed the Commissioner's finding of no probable cause.
It is to be hoped, however, that the members of the Review Board
will be assigned to adjudicatory panels in other cases. Such ex-
perience will be useful in performing the review function.
At the same time, use of the State Board of Human Rights
to review the Commissioner's determinations of no probable
cause makes it difficult to obtain consistency in an enforcement
policy that should seek to be selective in the cases carried to
formal hearing. Furthermore, though the hearing before the
Review Board is to be "informal," it will obviously approach
an adjudicatory hearing. Undue delay may therefore result be-
cause a reversal of the Commissioner's finding of no probable
cause will merely institute another full hearing before an ex-
aminer or board panel. For these reasons, the system of ad-
ministrative review of initial determinations of no probable cause
previously suggested 7 seems preferable.
Unlike the Model Act, the State Act does not provide for
judicial review of a final administrative determination of no
27. See Auerbach, supra note 2, at 325-26.
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probable cause.28
B. INTERIM RELIEF
Although section 363.06, subdivision 4(3), as enacted in 1967,
was based upon section 703 (f) of the Model Act, it failed to adopt
some of the most important features of the latter section which
are designed to provide interim relief to assure that persons dis-
criminated against do not win meaningless legal victories, par-
ticularly in housing cases. 29 Adequate interim relief is the key
to effective enforcement of an antidiscrimination law. The 1969
amendments eliminated the requirement of the State Act which
destroyed the effectiveness of its provision for interim relief-
the requirement in section 363.06, subdivision 4(3) that before the
Commissioner could obtain interim relief from a district court,
the charging party had to give security "in such sum as the court
deems proper for the payment of such costs and damages as may
be incurred or suffered by the party who is found to have been
wrongfully enjoined or restrained."
C. THE AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF AUTHORIZED
As amended in 1967, the State Act empowered the adjudica-
tory panels of the State Board of Human Rights or the hearing
examiners, upon finding an unfair discriminatory practice, not
only to issue a cease and desist order but also to direct the re-
spondent "to take such affirmative action as in the judgment of
the panel or examiner will effectuate the purposes of" the Act.
Unlike the Model Act, it did not attempt to specify the kinds of
affirmative action the panel or examiner may direct the re-
spondent to take.30
The 1969 amendments specifically authorize certain kinds of
affirmative action to be required, but not the whole panoply of
actions set forth in the Model Act. Thus section 363.071, subdivi-
sion 2 as amended provides:
The panel or examiner may order the respondent to pay the
charging party compensatory damages, except damages for
mental anguish or suffering, and may also order the respondent
to pay the charging party punitive damages in an amount not
less than $25 nor more than $100. In addition to the afore-
said remedies, in a case involving discrimination in
(a) employment, the panel or examiner may order the hir-
ing, reinstatement or upgrading of an employee with or without
28. See id. at 322-27.
29. See id. at 337-40.
30. See id. at 345-46.
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back pay, admission or restoration to membership in a labor
organization, or his admission to or participation in an appren-
ticeship training program, on-the-job training program, or other
retraining program, or any other relief the panel or examiner
deems just and equitable.
(b) housing, the panel or examiner may order the lease, or
rental of the housing accomodation to the charging party, or
the sale, lease or rental of a like accommodation owned by or
under the control of the person against whom the complaint
was filed, according to terms as listed with a real estate broker,
or if no such listing has been made, as otherwise advertised or
offered by the vendor or lessor, or any other relief the panel or
examiner deems just and equitable.
Except for the provision authorizing the panel or examiner to
pay damages to the charging party, the 1969 amendments added
little to the pre-existing powers of the panel or examiner. They
merely enumerate the affirmative remedies which are standard
in these cases and obviously included in the broad grant of au-
thority to require the taking of such affirmative action as will
effectuate the Act's purposes. The specification, moreover, may
provoke questions whether the legislature intended panels and
examiners not to direct the taking of the other kinds of affirma-
tive action enumerated in the Model Act but omitted from the
State Act.
Such questions are most likely to arise under section 363.071,
subdivision 2(b). Section 706(b) (4) of the Model Act states that
affirmative action includes the "sale, exchange, lease, rental, as-
signment or sublease of real property to an individual." Section
706(b) (8) separately includes the
.cancellation, rescission or revocation of a contract, deed, lease or
other instrument transferring real property, which is the sub-ject of a complaint of a discriminatory practice, to a person who
had actual knowledge or record notice, prior to the transfer or
the execution of the legally binding obligation to make the
transfer, that a determination of reasonable cause has been made
with respect to the discriminatory practice.
Reading these two provisions of the Model Act together, it is
reasonable to conclude that section 706(b) (4) relates to sales,
leases and rentals which can be effectuated either because the
real property in question has not been transferred to someone
else or, if it has been, the transfer may be rescinded or revoked
under section 706 (b) (8). Accordingly, section 706 (b) (4) would
not apply if the real property was transferred to a person who
had neither prior actual knowledge nor record notice that the real
property in question was the subject of a complaint of a dis-
criminatory practice and that a determination of reasonable cause
had been made with respect to the practice.
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The 1969 legislature did not enact a provision comparable to
section 706(b) (8) of the Model Act. Section 363.071, subdivision
2 (b), which is comparable to section 706 (b) (4) of the Model Act,
is not as broad as the latter insofar as it authorizes only ordering
the lease or rental, not the sale, to the charging party of the hous-
ing accommodation which is the subject of the charge. Does sec-
tion 363.071, subdivision 2 (b), then, authorize a panel or examiner
to order the transfer of real property to the charging party, as-
suming a like accommodation is not available, if the property has
been transferred to another person with or even without prior ac-
tual knowledge or record notice that the property in question was
the subject of a charge and a finding of probable cause had
been made? It should also be recalled at this point that the
State Act does not embody the provision of section 703 (g) of
the Model Act authorizing the administrative agency, after a
finding of probable cause, to
cause a notice to be posted on all entrances to the real property
which is the subject of the complaint ... stating that prospective
transferees will take the real property subject to the rights of
the complainant [charging party under the State Act] and to the
power of the Conunission to nullify a transfer of the real prop-
erty.
The section goes on to say that if "a notice is so posted, the
[administrative agency] shall file a copy in the [appropriate of-
fice] where the real property is situated, in the same man-
ner and with like effect as a [notice of 1is pendens] ."
The question posed above could be confidently answered in
the negative were it not for the fact that the 1969 amendments
added a new clause (4) to section 363.06, subdivision 4 providing:
If any lessor, after he has engaged in a discriminatory prac-
tice defined in section 363.03, subdivision 2, clause (1) (a),
shall lease or rent such dwelling unit to a person who has no
knowledge of such practice or of the existence of any charge
with respect thereto, such lessor shall be liable for actual
damages sustained by such person by reason of any final order
hereunder requiring such person to be evicted from such dwell-
ing unit.
This new clause contemplates an eviction order against a
lessee or renter with "no knowledge," let alone actual knowledge
or record notice, of the discriminatory practice or a charge re-
specting it. Furthermore, it contemplates such an order even if
the dwelling unit in question was leased or rented before
probable cause was found. Should section 363.071, subdivision 2
(b) then be read as authorizing the eviction orders contemplated
by section 363.06, subdivision 4(4)? If so, then it can also and
more easily be read to authorize eviction of a lessee or renter with
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actual knowledge or record notice, prior to the lease or rental,
that the lessor has engaged in a discriminatory practice involving
the unit or that a charge with respect to the unit exists.
It seems difficult to justify eviction of a lessee or renter who
had "no knowledge" of either fact. Under the circumstances, sec-
tion 363.071, subdivision 2(b) may be read, most reasonably, as
authorizing an order that the housing accommodation involved in
the discrimination be leased or rented to the charging party only
if it is still available to be leased or rented or it has been leased
or rented to a person who had actual knowledge or who may be
charged with constructive knowledge, prior to the lease or rental,
that the dwelling unit was involved in a charge of a discrimina-
tory practice. In the latter case, the order that the housing ac-
commodation be leased or rented to the charging party would
be accompanied by an order to evict the lessee or renter. The
words "no knowledge" in section 363.06, subdivision 4(4) would
accordingly be read as meaning "no actual knowledge" and im-
plying constructive knowledge.
Under the State Act, the lessee or renter may be charged
with having such constructive knowledge only if the district
court, under section 363.06, subdivision 4 (3), grants some form of
temporary relief which the lessor disregards, notice of which the
lessee or renter may be held to as a matter of law. But tem-
porary relief may be granted by a district court only at the in-
sistence of the Commissioner and only after the Commissioner
(and, in some cases, the court as well) finds that probable cause
exists to believe that the lessor has engaged in a discriminatory
practice. Under the broad authority given the district court by
section 363.06, subdivision 4(3) to grant such temporary relief "as
it deems just and proper," the court may then, for example, order
a notice of the complaint to be posted on all entrances to the real
property involved and require that a copy of the posted notice be
filed in the same manner as a notice of is pendens. Prospective
lessees and renters would then have legal notice that a complaint
is pending and they will lease or rent subject to the rights of the
charging party and the power of the panel or examiner to require
the lessee's or renter's eviction.
It should be noted, too, that section 363.06, subdivision 4(4),
like section 363.071, subdivision 2 (b), does not deal with sales of
houses involved in discriminatory practices. Doubt would remain
as to the power of a panel or examiner under section 363.071, sub-
division 2 to order the cancellation of the sale of a house involved
in a discriminatory practice even to a purchaser with prior actual
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knowledge or record notice of the pending complaint. Yet there
is little reason not to give such power to the panels and exam-
iners.
In all likelihood, too, the State Act will not be held to em-
power a panel or examiner to direct the affirmative action of
payment to an injured party of profits obtained by a respondent
through a violation of the anti-blockbusting provision of section
363.03, subdivision 2 (4).
Finally, it should be noted that even the provision authoriz-
ing the panel or examiner to order the respondent to pay damages
to the charging party is not as strong as the corresponding pro-
vision of the Model Act. The Model Act does not exclude
damages for mental anguish or suffering, as does the State Act.
Unlike the State Act, it specifically permits costs, including a
reasonable attorney's fee, to be recovered by the charging party.
And it authorizes minimum damages to be assessed at $500 for
each violation, while the State Act authorizes the assessment of
punitive damages, in addition to compensatory damages (except
damages for mental anguish or suffering), in an amount not less
than $25 nor more than $100. Thus the recovery under the State
Act may be less than $500.
VII. SANCTIONS FOR VIOLATION OF STATE ACT
The 1969 amendments added a number of additional sanc-
tions to help enforce the prohibitions of the State Act.
A. DAMAGES TO VICTIM OF DISCRIMINATION
As we just saw, section 363.071, subdivision 2 of the State Act
has been amended to authorize the panel or examiner to order the
respondent to pay the charging party compensatory and punitive
damages within specified limits. A provision has also been added
to section 363.091 directing the district court, in the event it
sustains such an award of damages or modifies it either in a re-
view, enforcement or combined review-enforcement proceeding,
to enter judgment on the order of the panel or examiner, or on
such order as modified by the court, "in the same manner as in the
case of an order of the district court, as provided in section
546.27."
B. DAMAGES TO EVICTED LESSEES OR RENTERS
As we saw, the 1969 amendments added a clause (4) to section
363.06, subdivision 4 to make lessors liable to lessees or renters
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evicted from dwelling units involved in the discriminatory prac-
tices of the lessor. In addition to the difficulties with this pro-
vision we have already considered,3' there seems to be no reason
why only lessors who engage in the discriminatory practices pro-
hibited by section 363.03, subdivision 2 (1) (a), and not in those
prohibited by (1) (b) or (1) (c), should be subjected to the new
liability.
On the other hand, if a lessor is subject to such liability when
ultimately found to have engaged in a discriminatory practice,
there is no reason why the lessor should not be protected, as he
is under section 703 (f) (2) of the Model Act, when the complaint
against him is ultimately dismissed and he suffers damages and
costs because of the temporary relief granted to the charging
party. Section 703(f) (2) provides that in such case the charged
party may recover such damages and costs from the state.
C. LICENSE REVOCATION
As amended in 1967, the State Act, unlike the Model Act,
contained no provision authorizing the revocation of licenses of
persons found to have violated the Act.32 The 1969 amendments
added such a provision in a new subdivision 4 to section 363.071
of the State Act. In some respects, this new provision may be
"broader" and in others "narrower"--from the perspective of de-
terring violations-than the comparable provisions in sections
706 (c) and 805 of the Model Act. Section 363.071, subdivision 4
provides:
In the case of a respondent which is subject to the licensing
or regulatory power of the state or any political subdivision or
agency thereof, if the panel or hearing examiner determines that
the respondent has engaged in a discriminatory practice, and if
the respondent does not cease to engage in such discriminatory
practice, the commissioner may so certify to the licensing or
regulatory agency. Unless such determination of discriminatory
practice is reversed in the course of judicial review, a final de-
termination is binding on the licensing or regulatory agency.
Such agency may take appropriate administrative action, includ-
ing suspension or revocation of the respondent's license or cer-
tificate of public convenience and necessity, if such agency is
otherwise authorized to take such action.
The State Act may be broader than the Model Act in that it
authorizes the suspension or revocation of certificates of public
convenience and necessity as well as of licenses. Possibly, but
not very likely, the term "license" in the Model Act may be read
31. See pp. 274-76 supra.
32. See Auerbach, supra note 2, at 360-61.
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to include a certificate of public convenience and necessity. The
State Act removes all doubt on this score. So, for example, under
the State Act motor carriers violating its provisions may have
their certificates of public convenience and necessity or permits
suspended or revoked.
33
The State Act may be narrower than the Model Act in a num-
ber of ways. First, it grants no independent authority to suspend
or revoke a license or certificate for violation of its provisions. It
authorizes such action only if the licensing or regulatory agency
is "otherwise authorized to take" it. This means that the agency
must be authorized by some other statute to suspend or revoke
licenses or certificates for reasons other than violation of the
State Act. For example, franchises, permits or certificates of
convenience and necessity may be issued by the State Public
Service Commission to common carrier railroads,3 4 pipelines,
sluiceways, conveyor belts and similar types of mechanical con-
veyors.3 5 But there seems to be no provision in either chapter
218 or chapter 221 authorizing the suspension or revocation of
such a franchise, permit or certificate of convenience and neces-
sity for any reason. This may mean that the legislature regards
the services rendered by these enterprises as so important that
resort to suspension or revocation of their permission to do busi-
ness is not deemed an appropriate sanction to enforce the law. It
is doubtful that this sanction would be applied to these enter-
prises even under a provision like that in section 805 of the Model
Act. Yet so long as the State Act generally gives the agency dis-
cretion, and does not compel it, to suspend or revoke the license
or certificate of a violator, there is no reason why it should not
give the agency this authority even if the agency does not other-
wise possess it.
The State Act may also be narrower than the Model Act be-
cause a license or certificate may not be suspended or revoked
unless it has been finally determined that the holder has en-
gaged in a discriminatory practice and the Commissioner certifies
that the holder has not stopped the practice. The Model Act
does not allow such a free "first bite." Suspension or revoca-
tion may follow the initial determination that the holder engaged
33. See MIN. STAT. ch. 221 (1969). Although section 363.071(4)
does not specify a "permit," a "permit" is defined in ch. 221 as "the
license, or franchise, which may be issued to motor carriers, . . . au-
thorizing the use of the highways of Minnesota for transportation for
hire." MINN. STAT. § 221.011(8) (1969).
34. MiNN. STAT. § 218.041(2) (2) (1969).
35. MINN. STAT. §§ 221.54-.55 (1969).
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in the discriminatory practice.
This broader aspect of the Model Act is in part balanced by
the requirement, not found in the State Act, that, before a license
may be suspended or revoked, the agency administering the
Model Act must also determine "that the discriminatory practice
was authorized, requested, commanded, performed or knowingly
or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors of the respondent
or by an officer or executive agent within the scope of his em-
ployment." This condition was inserted "to assure that the
remedy [which the Uniform Law Commissioners acknowledged
to be severe] is limited to flagrant cases, and is not applied when
a low-level employee discriminates . . . . M This condition is
preferable to the "second-bite" requirement of the State Act.
On the one hand, the latter does not assure that the remedy will
not be applied when the violations are not flagrant, that is, when
the second or subsequent violations are committed by low-level
employees. This fact, of course, may be taken into consideration
by the licensing or regulatory agency in exercising its discretion
to suspend or revoke. But it is best if the agency exercising this
discretion does not have to evaluate the nature or seriousness
of the violation, which it is not equipped to do. The Commis-
sioner may take this fact into consideration himself when decid-
ing whether to certify that the holder has not stopped the dis-
criminatory practice. In any case, the Model Act imposes as a
requirement what is at most a consideration affecting the exer-
cise of discretion under the State Act.
On the other hand, the State Act requirement does not as-
sure that the sanction will be applied in every flagrant case.
Suspension or revocation cannot be invoked even if the violation
was authorized, requested, commanded, performed or knowingly
or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors of the license or
certificate holder or by an officer or executive agent acting
within the scope of his employment, so long as the violation is
not repeated. This condition deprives the sanction of needed
deterrent value.
Finally, it is not clear how, under section 363.071, subdivision
4, the question whether the respondent has stopped the discrimi-
natory practice will be determined if the Commissioner and the
respondent disagree about the matter. The first sentence of the
subdivision seems to leave this determination to the Commis-
36. MoDEL ANT-DiscRImNATION ACT, supra note 3, § 706(c), com-
ment.
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sioner alone. But the second sentence implies the possibility of
judicial review of this determination. It would not be sensible
to read the words "such determination" in the second sentence to
refer only to the initial determination by the panel or examiner
because there is just as much reason to subject the second or
subsequent charge of violation to hearing, administrative adjudi-
cation and judicial review as there is with the first. Two possi-
bilities then exist. The second or subsequent charge, if con-
tested, may be submitted to a panel or examiner for hearing and
adjudication and any finding of a continuation of the discrimina-
tory practice subjected to judicial review. Another possibility
arises from the fact that a failure to stop the discriminatory prac-
tice would constitute contempt of the original cease and desist
order. If, then, the license or certificate holder is cited to the
district court for contempt and the court finds the holder to be
in contempt, the Commissioner may make the necessary certifi-
cation under subdivision 4. The latter alternative seems the
more desirable because it would be more expeditious and invoke
the penalties for contempt as well.
D. CONTRACT TERMINATION
As amended in 1967, the State Act authorized no special
sanction to be imposed upon a party to a contract with the state
or a political subdivision thereof that violated the Act. Section
181.59 of the Minnesota Statutes, however, did so.3 7 Without
repealing section 181.59, the 1969 amendments added the follow-
ing subdivision 5 to section 363.071:
In the case of a respondent which is a party to a public con-
tract, if the panel or hearing examiner determines that the re-
spondent has engaged in a discriminatory practice, the com-
missioner may so certify to the contract letting agency. Unless
such finding of a discriminatory practice is reversed in the
course of judicial review, a final determination is binding on
the contract letting agency and such agency may take appro-
priate administrative action, including the imposition of fi-
nancial penalties or termination of the contract, in whole or in
part, if such agency is otherwise authorized to take such action.
The new subdivision 5 adds substantively to the provisions
of section 181.59. It is not limited to public contracts for ma-
terials, supplies or construction but covers all other contracts as
well-e.g., a contract for architectural or other technical con-
sulting services. It is aimed not only at discrimination in em-
ployment but at all other discriminatory practices as well-e.g.,
37. See Auerbach, supra note 2, at 361-63.
[Vol. 55:259
1970] MINNESOTA ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACT 281
in connection with any facilities provided by or under the con-
trol of the employer, such as housing facilities, locker rooms,
wash rooms, rest rooms, restaurants, parking lots and recreation
facilities.
The new subdivision 5 does not require, as does section
181.59, that the discriminatory practice must be in connection
with employment "for the performance of any work under" the
contract or subcontract with the state or a political subdivision
thereof. Nor should such a requirement be read into the new
subdivision 5. A contractor who, for example, violates the State
Act on jobs other than in the performance of his public contract
may demonstrate in this way too that he is not fit to be a public
contractor.
Unlike section 181.59, which authorizes forfeiture of money
due or to become due under a public contract only for a second
or subsequent violation,38 subdivision 5 authorizes the imposition
of financial penalties, as well as termination of the contract, for a
first violation. It is also unlike section 363.071, subdivision 4 in
this respect. The legislature may have regarded the revocation
or suspension of a license or certificate of public convenience and
necessity as a more severe sanction than the termination of a
public contract or imposition of financial penalties upon a public
contractor. But this may not be so in every case. It is reason-
able to think that the absence of a "second-bite" condition in
subdivision 5 attests to the lack of necessity for or desirability of
such a condition in subdivision 4.
Finally, unlike section 181.59, subdivision 5 applies not only
to discrimination "by reason of race, creed, or color," but also
because of national origin or sex.
The new subdivision 5, together with the new section 363.073,
authorizes the Commissioner of Human Rights to participate in
the administration of these provisions affecting public contracts.
It would facilitate administration, as we shall see,3 9 if the Gov-
ernor also designated the Commissioner to enforce the provisions
of section 181.59.
Section 363.071, subdivision 5 of the State Act is broader than
the comparable section 706 (d) of the Model Act in some ways.
The latter requires that the discriminatory practice occur "in the
course of performing under a contract or subcontract, with the
38. Section 181.59, however, authorizes termination of a contract,
in whole or in part, for a first violation.
39. See p. 285 infra.
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State or political subdivision or agency thereof . . . ." As we
saw, subdivision 5 makes no such requirement. Subdivision 5
also does not contain the provision found in the Model Act that a
violation may be certified to the contracting agency only "if the
discriminatory practice was authorized, requested, commanded,
performed, or knowingly or recklessly tolerated by the board of
directors of the respondent or by an officer or executive agent
acting within the scope of his employment . . . ." Given the
fact that the sanctions authorized by subdivision 5 may be im-
posed for a first violation, this omission is unfortunate.
Finally, the State Act is broader than the Model Act because,
unlike the latter, it authorizes the contract letting agency to
impose "financial penalties" upon a violating public contractor.
This provision is in accord with pre-existing policy in the state
and cities of Minnesota, as exemplified by section 181.59 and the
Minneapolis Civil Rights Ordinance. 40 But unlike the latter, the
State Act unfortunately prescribes no standards to guide the
contract letting agency in fixing the amount of money penalties.
In one respect, the State Act may be narrower than the
Model Act. As in the case of subdivision 4 discussed above, sub-
division 5 does not give the contract letting agency an inde-
pendent authority to terminate the contract or impose financial
penalties. The agency may do so only if it "is otherwise au-
thorized to take such action." The Model Act itself authorizes
the taking of such action. This may not be a significant restric-
tion on the effectiveness of the sanctions in question because it
will be a rare public contract indeed that does not provide for
termination in whole or in part and even imposition of financial
penalties upon the contractor for some reason other than viola-
tion of the State Act. A contractor may also be "otherwise au-
thorized to take such action" by virtue of section 181.59 or a
municipal ordinance.
Section 806(2) of the Model Act also authorizes the contract-
ing agency to
assist the State and all political subdivisions and agencies
thereof to refrain from entering into further contracts, or ex-
tensions or other modifications of existing contracts, with the
respondent, until the [agency administering the Act] is satis-
fied that the respondent will carry out policies in compliance
with the provisions of this Act.
The 1969 amendments added a new section 363.073 to the
State Act which spells out in detail how the Commissioner of
40. See Auerbach, supra note 2, at 362-63.
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Human Rights may effectuate the policy embodied in section
806(2) of the Model Act. This provision forbids any "department
or agency" of the state to award a public contract to any firm or
person which does not possess or has not applied for a certificate
of compliance with the State Act. The Commissioner of Human
Rights is authorized to issue these certificates "to bidders on pub-
lic contracts" under rules and regulations promulgated by him in
accordance with the provisions of the State Administrative Pro-
cedure Act. This section does not expressly cover the award of
contracts by political subdivisions of the state, but only by a "de-
partment or agency" of the state. Section 363.071, subdivision 5,
it should be recalled, provides for the certification by the Com-
missioner to the "contract letting agency" of a violation com-
mitted by "a respondent which is a party to a public contract."
Neither "public contract" nor "contract letting agency" is de-
fined in the State Act. But "public contract" is broad enough
to include a contract with a political subdivision of the state.
The remedial purposes of the Act call for this inclusion, par-
ticularly since 181.59 expressly includes contracts with political
subdivisions of the state and is clearly indicative of the state's
policy in this regard. Section 363.071, subdivision 4, which au-
thorizes the suspension or revocation of a violator's license or
certificate of public convenience and necessity, also expressly
includes licenses or certificates issued by political subdivisions
of the state and their agencies.
No reason appears why subdivision 5 of section 363.071 should
be read differently in this respect from subdivision 4. And if
"public contract" in subdivision 5 includes contracts with politi-
cal subdivisions of the state and their agencies, section 363.073
should similarly be construed, by defining an "agency of the
State" to include a political subdivision thereof. The argument
for such a construction is further strengthened by the fact that
subdivision 2 of section 363.073, set forth below, authorizes the
denial, suspension or revocation of a certificate of compliance if
it is found that the applicant or holder has committed an unfair
discriminatory practice "in respect of a public contract." The
term "public contract" in subdivision 2 is not expressly limited to
contracts with departments and agencies of the state in the nar-
rower sense. But of course it could also be argued, with force,
that the public contracts referred to in subdivision 2 are those
for which certificates of compliance are needed under subdivi-
sion 1.
It is also recognized that Minnesota Statutes, section 16.011
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defines an "agency of the state" to exclude political subdivisions
of the state. But this definition should not govern the State
Act if a more inclusive definition, reasonably supported by the
language, would better carry out the purposes of the Act.
As of this writing, the Commissioner of Human Rights pro-
poses to adopt neither the most inclusive alternative nor the
most restrictive. The proposed rules for the issuance of cer-
tificates of compliance, following section 181.59 almost verbatim,
define a "public contract" as "any contract for or on behalf of
the state or its political subdivisions, including any county, city,
borough, town, township, school, school district or any other dis-
trict in the state."'1  "Contract letting agency" is defined as "any
department or agency of the state or its political subdivisions
which is responsible for awarding public contracts." But the
proposed rules define an "agency" as "any department or agency
of the state, including state officers, boards, commissions, bu-
reaus, divisions or departments of the state."
Consequently, an applcation for a certificate of compliance
could be denied, or a certificate suspended or revoked, if it
were found that the applicant or holder had committed an un-
fair discriminatory practice in respect of a contract for or on
behalf of a political subdivision of the state. But such action
under section 363.073 would bar only state agencies, as narrowly
defined in the proposed rules, from awarding a contract to such
an applicant or holder. It would not bar political subdivisions
of the state from awarding contracts to such an applicant or
holder. But again it should be stressed that, under section
363.071, subdivision 5, the Commissioner might certify the viola-
tion to the contract letting agency and that agency might termi-
nate the contract in whole or in part. The sanctions of section
181.59 might also be invoked. The Commissioner's proposed rules
would facilitate the use of these two sections by requiring that
notification of the denial, suspension or revocation of any cer-
tificate of compliance be given to the political subdivision of
the state for which the applicant for or holder of a certificate is
performing under a public contract as well as to all state de-
partments and agencies and local human rights commissions.
The important difference remains that the refusal to award
a contract to a violator is mandatory under 363.073, subdivision 1
41. In the Matter of the Proposed Adoption of the Rules of the
State Department of Human Rights Governing Certificates of Compli-
ance for Public Contracts (undated). As of this writing, rules have
not yet been promulgated.
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but is only discretionary under section 363.071, subdivision 5
and section 181.59. The Commissioner's proposed rules contain
the ambiguous directive that, upon receiving notice of the denial,
suspension or revocation of a certificate of compliance, "the con-
tract letting agency shall take such remedial action as required
or permitted by law or ordinance." If this provision is intended
to compel a political subdivision of the state to act under sec-
tion 363.071, subdivision 5 or section 181.59, it is an assertion of
power by the Commissioner which he does not possess under
the statutes.
By providing for the issuance of certificates of compliance
"to bidders on public contracts," section 363.073 may be taken
as applying only to contracts which must be awarded on competi-
tive bids. Neither section 363.071, subdivision 5 nor section 181.59
contains such a limitation. The Commissioner's proposed rules
seem to accept this limitation.42 But it would be reasonable to
read "bidders" to mean any persons seeking to enter into public
contracts. Such an interpretation is especially warranted be-
cause contracts not covered by section 363.073 may nevertheless
be covered by the substantive provisions of 363.071, subdivision 5
and section 181.59. The Commissioner in the case of the former,
and the governor in the case of the latter, would still be obliged
to enforce these provisions. For this reason, in the interest of ad-
ministrative consistency, it would be wise if the governor en-
trusted the administration of section 181.59 to the Commis-
sioner of Human Rights. But the scope of the latter section
should not be narrowed by the Commissioner. There appears
to be no policy reason why only contracts which must be awarded
on competitive bids should be subject to the mandatory require-
ments of section 363.073. The most efficient use of administrative
resources, however, may justify the exemption, by administrative
rule, of employers who do not transact an appreciable amount of
business with the state annually and employ a relatively small
number of persons.
Subdivision 2 of section 363.073 provides:
Certificates of compliance may be suspended or revoked, or
a pending application for a certificate may be denied, by a
panel or examiner, in an order based on a finding that the
holder or applicant has committed an unfair discriminatory
practice in respect of a public contract; provided, however,
that:
42. The proposed rules define a "bidder" as "any person who sub-
mits a bid to any agency of the State for a contract which is required by
law or otherwise to be based on competitive bids."
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(1) any contractor certified to be in compliance with reg-
ulations of the federal government in respect of discriminatory
practices shall also be certified by the state; and
(2) a contract awarded by a department or agency of the
state shall not be terminated or abridged because of suspen-
sion, revocation or denial of a certificate based upon an unfair
discriminatory practice for which the commissioner's complaint
was issued after the date of the contract award; and
(3) in the case of a respondent whose certificate of compli-
ance has been suspended, revoked, or denied, the commissioner
shall issue a certificate of compliance in accordance with sub-
division 1 within 90 days after he finds that the respondent has
ceased engaging in any unfair discriminatory practice.
This subdivision is most confusing, particularly in relation to
subdivision 1 of the same section and section 363.071, subdivision
5. Its substantive relation to the latter section will first be con-
sidered. Section 363.073, subdivision 2 authorizes the denial, sus-
pension or revocation of a certificate of compliance only if a panel
or examiner finds that the applicant or holder has committed an
unfair discriminatory practice "in respect of a public contract."
As we saw, section 363.071, subdivision 5 is not so limited; the
violation invoking the sanctions therein provided need not occur
in the course of performing a public contract. That section
363.073, subdivision 2 contains such a restriction may be ground
for implying it in 363.071, subdivision 5, because it makes sense
to read these two closely related statutory provisions in a uniform
fashion. But as indicated above, the state's antidiscrimination
policy will be furthered if such a restriction is not read into sec-
tion 363.071, subdivision 5. One can only wonder why it was
incorporated in section 363.073, subdivision 2.
Second, section 363.071, subdivision 5 does not contain the
limitation found in section 363.073, subdivision 2(2). Since the
discriminatory practice which triggers the sanction must be "in
respect of a public contract," it is impossible to imagine how it
can occur except "after the date of the contract award." In that
case, the complaint can only be issued after such date and no pub-
lic contract can ever be "terminated or abridged" because of the
suspension, revocation or denial of a certificate of compliance. In
this respect, section 363.073, subdivision 2 (2) would be controlling
because it limits the discretion of the contract letting agency,
whereas section 363.071, subdivision 5 merely authorizes the exer-
cise of the agency's discretion. This also makes it very doubtful
that financial penalties could be imposed under section 363.071,
subdivision 5 because that might be held to be an abridgement of
the contract within the meaning of section 363.073, subdivision
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2 (2). Thus the only sanction permitted by these two sections,
read together, seems to be disqualification for future contracts.
It is important to add, however, that section 363.073, subdivision
2(2) does not override section 181.59, which continues to have
force on its own account.
Section 363.073, subdivision 2 (1) also seems to be inconsistent
with section 363.071, subdivision 5 and hard to justify on its
merits. It is certainly not contemplated that a contractor certi-
fied to be in compliance under section 363.073 may still be subject
to the penalties provided by section 363.071, subdivision 5. Yet it
is possible that a contractor "certified to be in compliance with
regulations of the federal government in respect of discriminatory
practices" may be committing unfair discriminatory practices in
respect of contracts with Minnesota departments and agencies.
Why should not all the sanctions of the State Act then apply?
The reference to contractors "certified to be in compliance
with regulations of the federal government" is also not entirely
clear, but probably brings into operation the provisions of Execu-
tive Order No. 11246, as amended. 43 Under these provisions, fed-
eral government contractors and subcontractors, as wel as con-
tractors and subcontractors performing under federally assisted
construction contracts, must file compliance reports with the
contracting or assisting agency or the Secretary of Labor, as may
be directed. The agency or the Secretary may publish the names
of contractors or labor unions which have complied or failed to
comply with the executive order. The Secretary is also author-
ized to provide for the issuance of a U.S. Government Certificate
of Merit to employers or labor unions engaged in work under gov-
ernment contracts or under federally assisted construction con-
tracts. He must first be satisfied that the personnel and employ-
ment practices of the employer, or the personnel, training, ap-
prenticeship, membership, grievance and representation, upgrad-
ing and other practices and policies of the labor union, conform to
the purposes and provisions of the executive order. The Certifi-
cate of Merit is subject to suspension or revocation by the Sec-
retary if, in his judgment, the holder of the certificate has failed
to comply with the provisions of the executive order.
A contractor, then, may be said to be certified as being in
compliance with regulations of the federal government, within
the meaning of section 363.073, if he holds a Certificate of Merit
or if his name has been published as a contractor complying with
43. See note 11 supra.
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the provisions of the Executive Order. Finally, it should be
noted that the federal government regulations reach labor unions
working on federal contracts or subcontracts or federally assisted
construction contracts. The language of section 706(d) of the
Model Act accomplishes a similar result by its reference to "a
respondent who is found . . . to have engaged in a discrimina-
tory practice in the course of performing under a contract or sub-
contract with the State or political subdivision or agency
thereof." Such a respondent may be a labor union. But labor
unions do not seem to be reached by either section 363.071, subdi-
vision 5 of the State Act which speaks of "a respondent which is
a party to a public contract," or section 363.073, subdivision 1
which authorizes the issuance of certificates of compliance "to
bidders on public contracts."
The relation between subdivisions 1 and 2 of the new section
363.073 raises perplexing procedural problems, so perplexing,
indeed, that they create grave doubts about the usefulness of
the whole scheme of enforcement envisaged by the new section
363.073. Subdivision 1 of that section compels state departments
and agencies to award contracts to business entities which have
applications pending for certificates of compliance. The general
purpose of this requirement is understandable and laudable-not
to bar any business entity from being awarded a state contract
while the Commissioner is investigating the question of its com-
pliance with the State Act.
In effect, as we shall see, this may mean that contracts may
continue to be awarded to any business entity which has applied
for a certificate of compliance until such time as it is found to
have committed an unfair discriminatory practice in respect of
a public contract. Then its application for a certificate of com-
pliance may be denied and it may be debarred from receiving
future state contracts. Similarly, a holder of a certificate of
compliance may continue to receive state contracts until it is
found to have committed an unfair discriminatory practice in
respect of a public contract. Then its certificate may be revoked
or suspended and it may be debarred from receiving future state
contracts. But why, then, is the whole system of certificates of
compliance necessary? Why would not the simple provision of
section 806 (2) of the Model Act have sufficed? If the legisla-
ture intended the sanction for violation embodied in section
363.073-debarment from future state contracts-to be manda-
tory, rather than discretionary as in the Model Act, it could have
provided that a business entity which violates the State Act shall
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be barred from entering into contracts with the state or any of
its agencies or political subdivisions until a panel or examiner
finds that it has ceased to be a violator and will carry out policies
in compl'ance with the Act.
While a business entity with a pending application for a
certificate of compliance may receive state contracts while its
compliance is being investigated, the Commissioner is not re-
quired to issue a certificate of compliance until his investigation
is completed and he is satisfied the applicant is complying. It is
important that a certificate not be issued until the Commissioner
is so satisfied because confidence in his effectiveness will be
shaken if he issues certificates to applicants subsequently found
to have violated the State Act.
It is not clear from the Commissioner's proposed rules that
this is the position he is taking. The statute itself creates diffi-
culties for this position by separating the power to issue cer-
tificates from the power to deny them. Subdivision 1 of section
363.073 empowers the Commissioner of Human Rights-who has
no formal adjudicatory functions under the State Act-to "issue"
the certificates of compliance. Yet subdivision 2 empowers only
a state board panel or a hearing examiner, not the Commissioner,
to deny, suspend or revoke a certificate. If, therefore, after con-
sidering an application for a certificate, the Commissioner de-
cides to issue it, he may do so. But if he decides not to issue it,
he must refer the matter to a panel or examiner who may deny
the certificate only "in an order based on a finding that the
holder or applicant has committed an unfair discriminatory prac-
tice in respect of a public contract."
Under the proposed rules, a certificate of compliance would
be issued within 90 days after receipt of the application, on the
basis of the application alone, to any applicant who (1) is not
engaged in the performance of a public contract at the time of
making an application; and (2) does not become so engaged while
the application is pending, and (3) has not performed on a pub-
lic contract within six months of making the application.4 4 The
applicant, however, would first have to certify to the Commis-
sioner, as all applicants would be required to do, "that he will
abide by the terms and conditions of the certificate of compliance,
including the compliance review procedures..., and will agree
44. As of this writing, the draft rules do not set forth this third
category, but this is an obvious oversight for reasons that will become
apparent.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
to comply with the Act and the rules and regulations adopted
pursuant thereto with respect to public contracts."
The six-month limitation imposed above is intended to
achieve consistency with the policy expressed in section 363.06,
subdivision 3 that a "charge of an unfair discriminatory practice
must be filed within six months after the occurrence of the prac-
tice." This limitation makes sense in connection with initial
applications for certificates, the only situation to which it applies.
It would not apply to a business entity which has had its applica-
tion for a certificate denied or its certificate of compliance sus-
pended or revoked and subsequently applies for reinstatement of
the old certificate or issuance of a new one. Presently, there is
no employer in the state under a formal order to cease and
desist from violating the Act.
The proposed rules authorize the Commissioner to send a
compliance review questionnaire (which is not set forth in the
proposed rules) to an applicant for a certificate of compliance
who has performed on a public contract within six months of
making the application or is performing on a public contract at
the time of, or subsequent to, the making of the application.
The questionnaire normally would have to be completed and
returned within 30 days of its receipt. In addition, the Commis-
sioner could decide to make an on-site investigation of the busi-
ness operation of such an applicant. In that case, the applicant
would be obliged to give the Commissioner access during normal
business hours to "books, records, accounts and personnel rele-
vant to compliance with the Act with respect to public contracts."
Holders of certificates of compliance would be asked to file
periodic contract compliance review reports. In addition, the
Commissioner could conduct further investigations, including
review of employment practices and on-site inspections of the
holder's business operations with respect to public contracts.
Certificate holders would also be required to give the Commis-
sioner access during normal business hours to "books, records,
accounts and personnel relevant to compliance with the Act with
respect to any public contract which has been awarded to the
holder following the issuance of a certificate of compliance."
The proposed rules do not state what will happen if the
applicant for or holder of a certificate fails to meet one of these
obligations sought to be imposed upon him by the rules. But
they do provide that "any person violating, or failing to comply
with a provision of the ... rules and regulations contained herein
shall be deemed by the Commissioner to have committed an
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unfair discriminatory practice as set forth in section 363.03, sub-
division 6 (4) of the Act and the commissioner may issue a com-
plaint pursuant thereto." If then a panel or examiner finds that
such a violation was committed, could the certificate of compli-
ance be either denied, suspended or revoked? Probably not.
It is true that the failure to file a required questionnaire or
periodic report or the refusal to permit an on-site investigation
or access to records and personnel are unfair discriminatory prac-
tices within the meaning of section 363.03, subdivision 6(4),45
because such failures and refusals intentionally "resist, prevent,
impede or interfere with the commissioner ... in the perform-
ance of duty under" the Act. But section 363.073, subdivision 2
authorizes an application for a certificate to be denied, and a
certificate to be suspended or revoked, only by a panel or exam-
iner and then only in an order based on a finding that the ap-
plicant or holder has committed an unfair discriminatory practice
in respect of a public contract. It is possible to argue that in
the cases supposed there is interference with the Commissioner's
duty in respect of public contracts. But the statutory language
ordinarily would be taken to mean that the discriminatory prac-
tice invoking the sanction must be committed in the course of
performing under the public contract.
The difficulty cannot be obviated by rules declaring that the
failure to file a required questionnaire or a periodic report or
the refusal to permit an on-site investigation or access to records
and personnel shall be ground for denying a certificate or sus-
pending or revoking it, as the case may be. As we saw, the Com-
missioner has no authority to deny, suspend or revoke a cer-
tificate. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether his rule-making
authority under section 363.073, subdivision 1, or his general au-
thority under section 363.05, subdivision 1 (8) to "adopt suitable
rules and regulations for effectuating the purposes of" the Act,
empowers him to prescribe policies binding upon panels and
examiners in the exercise of their judicial functions. Finally,
the same difficulty would remain that only the commission of
an unfair discriminatory practice in respect of a public contract
is ground for denying, suspending or revoking a certificate.
Yet it would be absurd to compel the Commissioner to issue
a certificate of compliance in a case in which he is prevented by
the applicant itself from acquiring the information he thinks is
45. The proposed rules, quite properly, follow section 363.01, sub-
division 9 in defining an unfair discriminatory practice as any act
described in section 363.03.
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necessary to determine the applicant's compliance. Since an
applicant's refusal to cooperate in any of the ways mentioned is
a violation of section 363.03, subdivision 6 (4), the Commissioner
may issue a complaint and bring the matter to hearing before
a panel or examiner, looking to an order to the applicant to
cooperate. It is also possible that in such case the Commissioner
might even seek temporary relief from an appropriate district
court, under section 363.06, subdivision 4 (3), enjoining all con-
tract letting agencies from awarding any additional contracts
to the applicant until he cooperates with the Commissioner.
Furthermore, the Commissioner may exercise his subpoena power
under section 363.05, subdivision 1 (10), which is broad enough to
obtain most of the information the Commissioner may seek.
These are cumbersome ways for the Commissioner to obtain
the information he needs in order to decide whether a certificate
should be issued to an applicant. May not the Commissioner
promulgate a rule that an applicant's failure, upon the Commis-
sioner's request, to complete a compliance review questionnaire
and return it within the specified time or its refusal to permit an
on-site investigation or access to records and personnel will re-
sult in the Commissioner's refusal to issue the certificate? Such
a rule is certainly proper "for the issuance of certificates of com-
pliance" under subdivision 1. Thus there may be a refusal to
issue a certificate to such an applicant which is not a "denial"
of its application within the meaning of section 363.073. This
distinction is tolerable when it is recalled that state contracts may
continue to be awarded to such an applicant under section 363.073,
subdivision 1. After refusing to issue the certificate, the Com-
missioner could launch an investigation of the non-cooperator,
using his subpoena power and, if necessary, a proceeding under
section 363.03, subdivision 6 (4) that might lead to the formal
denial of the application.
May the Commissioner go further and promulgate a rule
that an application will not be regarded as "pending" within the
meaning of subdivision 1 unless and until at least the compliance
review questionnaire, which when requested becomes an integral
part of the "application," is properly filled in and returned? This
alternative would require that until then no state contract be
awarded the business entity in question. Such a result may be
inconsistent with the legislative intent expressed in section
363.073, subdivision 1 that contracts continue to be awarded while
the question of compliance is being investigated by the Commis-
sioner. Yet it may be argued that the rule suggested falls within
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the reasonable scope of the Commissioner's authority to define,
by rule, the term "application" in section 363.073, subdivision 1.
Greater difficulty would be presented by a rule stating that
refusal to permit an on-site investigation or access to records and
personnel will also be ground for holding that no "application" is
pending because the information so gathered is made part of the
application itself. Such a rule would seem to fly in the face of
the legislative intent.
Still greater difficulty would confront any effort to impose
an administrative sanction upon a certificate holder who refuses
to file periodic reports or permit on-site investigations or access
to records and personnel. The Commissioner, by rule, might
condition the initial issuance of the certificate upon the filing of
such reports and permitting such access. He might then make a
breach of any of these conditions ground for "rescission" of the
certificate by him, not "suspension" or "revocation" by a panel
or examiner. The rules might also provide that, in case of rescis-
sion of a certificate by the Commissioner, the former certificate
holder will be required to file a new application, including a
compliance review questionnaire. Whether these suggestions
would be looked upon as far-fetched by a court may depend upon
the need demonstrated by the Commissioner for such reports and
access.
Since such reports can only serve to alert the Commissioner
to the need to investigate compliance, the failure to file a re-
quired report may serve the same function. The Commissioner
could investigate every certificate holder who fails to file such
reports. He could then use his subpoena power and, if necessary,
proceedings under section 363.06, subdivision 6 (4) to obtain the
information he needs to determine whether to institute proceed-
ings looking to formal suspension or revocation of the certificate.
This alternative may also be the only one available to overcome
a refusal to permit an on-site investigation or access to records
and personnel.
Still other difficulties remain. The issuance or reinstatement
of a certificate, either upon an initial application therefor or fol-
lowing a denial, suspension or revocation, may be contested. The
decision of the Commissioner to issue or reinstate a certificate
constitutes a finding on his part that no probable cause exists to
believe that the applicant has engaged or is any longer engaging
in an unfair discriminatory practice in respect of a public con-
tract. Indeed, a charge against the applicant may be pending be-
fore the Commissioner at the same time as the proceeding for the
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issuance or reinstatement of a certificate. Yet there is no provi-
sion in section 363.073, or in the Commissioner's proposed rules
for appealing the issuance or reinstatement of a certificate by the
Commissioner even though a finding of no probable cause in con-
nection with a charge pending at the same time would be appeal-
able to the review board. Thus the possibility exists that a cer-
tificate may be issued or reinstated under circumstances giving
rise to a finding of probable cause by the review board and
further proceedings culminating in a final cease and desist order
against the certificate holder.
This possibility could be obviated by rules providing for pub-
lic notice of each application for a certificate and each proceed-
ing under section 363.073, subdivision 2(3). The rules should
further state that if a charge is filed against the person or firm
involved in such a pending application or proceeding, a certificate
will not be issued unless the Commissioner finds no probable
cause and his finding is not appealed to, or if appealed is sus-
tained by the review board. Of course if the charge is filed after
a certificate is issued or reinstated and is ultimately sustained, the
certificate may be suspended or revoked either for a first, second
or subsequent time.4"
If the Commissioner has probable cause to believe that an
applicant for or holder of a certificate has engaged in or is en-
gaging in an unfair discriminatory practice, the proposed rules
wisely provide that the Commissioner shall issue a complaint and
the denial, suspension or revocation of the certificate awaits
the outcome of the proceeding on the complaint. The outcome
will be simultaneously either the dismissal of the complaint and
the issuance or reinstatement of the certificate or the denial,
suspension or revocation of the certificate and the issuance of
an order directing the applicant to cease and desist and to take
such affirmative or remedial action as the panel, examiner or
courts may direct. This assures that the same panel or examiner
will handle all aspects of what is essentially one case, thereby
avoiding the possibility of contradictory findings by different
panels. It also assures that all aspects of the final administra-
46. A similar problem, it should be pointed out, is presented by
section 363.071(4), if the Commissioner determines that a respondent
has ceased the discriminatory practice in which he was previously found
to have engaged and, therefore, decides not to recommend suspension
or revocation of the respondent's license or certificate. The Commis-
sioner's determination in this context may also be contested. The
above suggestions with respect to section 363.073(2) (3) also apply to
section 363.071 (4).
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rive order issued in the case will be subject to judicial review at
the same time.
There is also the possibility that the applicant for a certificate
which was denied or the holder of a certificate which was sus-
pended or revoked may again apply for the issuance or reinstate-
ment of the certificate and that the Commissioner may find,
under section 363.073, subdivision 2 (3), that the applicant has
not ceased to engage in unfair discriminatory practices. (It
should be noted that these violations need not be committed in
performing under a public contract.) The Commissioner's pro-
posed rules merely provide that if the Commissioner finds that
the respondent-applicant 47 has not ceased violating the Act, he
"shall so notify the respondent-applicant in writing setting forth
his reasons therefor."
It is difficult to understand why section 363.073, subdivision
2 (3) does not call for a finding by a panel or examiner in such
a case. Furthermore, the State Act provides for no judicial re-
view of the Commissioner's finding in question. Yet the re-
spondent-applicant should be entitled to a hearing on the ques-
tion. The Commissioner's rules should provide either for initial
determination of the question at issue by a panel or examiner
or for appeal from his finding to a panel or examiner. Better
still, from the point of view of effective enforcement, contempt
proceedings should be instituted and the issuance or reinstate-
ment of the certificate should await the outcome of these pro-
ceedings.
Finally, section 363.073 does not specify the procedure to be
followed by the Commissioner in issuing certificates of compli-
ance or by panels and examiners in denying, suspending or re-
voking certificates. Nor does it provide for judicial review of
such action by panels and examiners.
When the denial, suspension or revocation of a certificate is
imposed only as an additional sanction accompanying an order
to cease and desist, the procedures set forth in the State Act
for processing complaints and for judicial review of orders of
panels and examiners will apply. The Commissioner's proposed
rules so provide but are probably unnecessary.
47. The proposed rules define a "respondent-applicant" as "any
person whose certificate of compliance has been denied or revoked pur-
suant to section 363.073, subdivision 2 of the Act and who submits a
compliance application to the commissioner." The definition, probably
inadvertently, omits a person whose certificate of compliance has been
suspended under section 363.073, subdivision 2.
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Nevertheless, there is little doubt about the Commissioner's
authority under section 363.073, subdivision 1 and section 363.05,
subdivision 1(8) to promulgate procedural rules to govern the
issuance, denial, suspension and revocation of certificates of com-
pliance. To the extent that such rules are needed, the State Act
grants express authority to promulgate them only to the Commis-
sioner, not to the panels and examiners. In making such rules
the Commissioner is not attempting to lay down substantive poli-
cies to control the panels and examiners.
Quite apart from the Commissioner's procedural rules, an
applicant for a certificate of compliance or a holder of such a
certificate is entitled to have a panel or examiner follow require-
ments of the State Administrative Procedure Act in deciding
whether to deny, suspend or revoke the certificate. The pro-
ceeding leading to such a decision is a "contested case" within the
meaning of section 15.0411, subdivision 4 of the State Administra-
tive Procedure Act because it is "a proceeding before an agency in
which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are
required by law or constitutional right to be determined after an
agency hearing." Setting aside the question of constitutional
right, it is reasonable to conclude that the requirement of section
363.073, subdivision 2 that a panel or examiner deny, suspend or
revoke a certificate only "in an order based on a finding that the
holder or applicant has committed an unfair discriminatory prac-
tice in respect of a public contract" clearly implies some kind of
hearing on which the finding may be based. In this way, the pro-
visions of sections 15.0418, 15.0419, 15.0421, 15.0422 and 15.0424
come into play.
For similar reasons, a finding by the Commissioner or, as sug-
gested above, a panel or examiner that a respondent-applicant
has not ceased engaging in unfair discriminatory practices, for
purposes of section 363.073, subdivision 2 (3), should also be sub-
ject to judicial review.
It should again be noted 48 that section 363.072, subdivision 1
provides that only a respondent aggrieved by a final decision of
the panel or examiner may seek judicial review. Thus, only appli-
cants denied certificates of compliance, or holders of such cer-
tificates which have been revoked or suspended, may seek ju-
dicial review under section 363.072, subdivision 1. Neither the
Commissioner nor a charging party is given standing by the State
Act to seek judicial review of a decision of a panel or examiner
48. See Auerbach, supra note 2, at 346-49.
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refusing to deny, suspend or revoke a certificate.
Reflection upon the difficulties inherent in section 363.073
only reinforces the view that a somewhat stronger version of
section 806 (2) of the Model Act would have sufficed to make the
compliance certificate system wholly unnecessary.
E. C~nvrNmAL PENAL=I
Prior to the 1969 amendments, the State Act did not make it
a crime to violate any of its provisions. The 1969 amendments
added a section 363.101 which declares it a misdemeanor for any
person to deny, or to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce another
person to deny an individual or group of individuals the full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, ad-
vantages and accommodations of a place of public accommoda-
tion because of race, color, creed, religion or national origin.
Section 363.101 states that this sanction is imposed in addition to
all other remedies provided by the State Act. There would seem
to be little justification for limiting the criminal penalty to viola-
tions of the guarantee of access to public accommodations.

